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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
No. 06-4694
                    
KERRYANN HOLSTER,
                                      Appellant
v.
MCMASTER-CARR SUPPLY COMPANY;
MCMASTER-CARR SUPPLY COMPANY PROFIT SHARING TRUST; 
JOHN DOE CORPORATIONS/ENTITIES 1-10
                    
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(D.C. Civil No. 04-cv-01791)
District Judge:  The Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr., Chief Judge
                    
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 27, 2007
                    
Before: BARRY, FUENTES and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: January 23, 2008 )
                    
OPINION
                    
BARRY, Circuit Judge
Appellant, KerryAnn Holster, appeals the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of appellees.  We will affirm.  
2I.
On Friday, February 6, 2004, Holster, a long-term employee of McMaster-Carr
Supply Company (“MCSC”), informed her supervisor, Shaun Sauer, that she had been
summoned for jury duty the following week.  According to Holster, Sauer told her that
she should take the week off and relax.  When Holster went to the courthouse on Monday
morning, she was told that she was not needed for jury duty that day and that from then
on she was to use a call-in line each morning and afternoon to find out whether it was
necessary to appear.  On Tuesday morning, she learned via the call-in line that she was
not needed for the morning session and, later, that she was not needed for the afternoon
session.  On Wednesday morning, she was excused for the remainder of the week. 
Holster had not gone to work on Monday because she did not think she could get there
before the end of her shift, and did not drive back and forth between the morning and
afternoon call-in times on Tuesday because she did not think she could get back to the
courthouse in time for the afternoon session if she learned that she was required to appear. 
Finally, she did not go to work on Wednesday morning because Sauer, she said, had told
her to take the week off.    
During the week, Sauer had called the courthouse to find out whether Holster had
been required to report for jury duty and learned that she had not.  Upon being told of this
by Sauer, Sauer’s manager, Steve Finn, consulted the branch manager, who told Finn to
speak to Holster when she returned to work and to terminate her if she did not have a
satisfactory explanation for her absence.  
3When Sauer asked Holster how jury duty had been, she replied that it was “a real
pain.”  She then asked him to note Thursday as a vacation day rather than a day on which
she served on the jury because it was a court holiday.  Finn later met with Holster and
asked her to explain her absence the previous week.  Holster told him that she did not
have enough time to report back to work on Monday or between the morning and
afternoon call-in times on Tuesday, but did not tell him that Sauer had told her to take the
week off, claiming she did not want Sauer to get into trouble.  After some discussion, she
told Finn that she did not want to argue anymore, and said, “[d]o what you have to do.” 
Finn informed her that she was terminated.    
Holster applied for unemployment benefits, but the Hearing Examiner found that
she had been terminated for gross misconduct and denied her claim.  She unsuccessfully
appealed to the Appeals Tribunal, the Board of Review, and the Appellate Division of the
New Jersey Superior Court.  She then filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District
of New Jersey, alleging that she was terminated because of her age, in violation of the
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12, and to prevent
her from receiving retiree health benefits and deprive her of continued contributions to
her profit sharing plan as part of a plan to terminate long term employees in favor of new
hires, in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29
U.S.C. § 1104.  She also alleged breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of
  The District Court dismissed these claims finding that they were preempted by ERISA. 1
Those dismissals are not challenged on appeal.  
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good faith and fair dealing.   1
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction over the ERISA claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a district court’s order granting
summary judgment is plenary.  Reese Bros., Inc. v. United States, 447 F.3d 229, 232 (3d
Cir. 2006).  We “may affirm the district court’s order if, when viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is ‘no genuine issue as to any material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ”  Id. (quoting Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
III.
As a preliminary matter, the District Court determined, after a careful review of
preclusion principles, that Holster was collaterally estopped from raising the issues of
whether she was given the week in question off and whether she was terminated for gross
misconduct.  The Court stated:  
Here, not only were the issues in question thoroughly considered in
the administrative channels, but the New Jersey Superior Court also
considered the issue on appeal.  As such, the issues . . . were actually
litigated.  Furthermore, it was necessary for the state administrative and
judicial bodies to determine the issues in order to issue a ruling.  Indeed, it
was the determination that Plaintiff had not been given the week off and
had been terminated for gross misconduct that prevented the issuance of
5unemployment benefits, and remained the sole factors to resolve throughout
that legal process.  Therefore, the unemployment hearing and rulings, both
administrative and judicial, satisfy all three prongs of the issue preclusion
analysis.  (16a).  
The Court also concluded that, for a host of reasons, it would not be unfair to apply issue
preclusion, not the least of which were the facts that Holster had counsel and had
thoroughly and vigorously litigated the issues in question through the administrative
channels and the Appellate Division.  
Quoting the holding in Olivieri v. V.M.F. Carpet, Inc., 897 A.2d 1003, 1013 (N.J.
2006), Holster argues that “unemployment compensation determinations are not entitled
to collateral estoppel effect.”  It certainly appears, at least to us, that unlike the
proceedings in Olivieri, the proceedings here, as the District Court found, were adequate
and fair.  The hearing before the Hearing Examiner covered 54 pages of transcript; the
Appeals Tribunal affirmed the finding of gross misconduct after yet another hearing; the
Board of Review affirmed, finding that Holster had been given a full and impartial
hearing and a complete opportunity to offer “any and all” evidence; and the Appellate
Division affirmed in a nineteen-page opinion upon being satisfied that there was
sufficient evidence to support the Board’s factual findings and legal conclusions.  
We would not hesitate to conclude that, on this record, collateral estoppel effect
should be accorded to the issues in dispute.  But the holding in Olivieri is quite clear –
“unemployment compensation proceedings do not afford litigants a full and fair
opportunity to litigate factual issues sufficient to warrant collateral estoppel effect.”  Id. at
  The District Court noted parenthetically that it was questionable that Holster’s2
replacement was sufficiently younger to create an inference of age discrimination
because, at the time of her termination, she was forty-two years old and her  replacement
was thirty-three years old.  Furthermore, Holster’s co-worker, who remains at MCSC,
was fifty years old, Sauer was thirty-seven years old, Finn was forty-three years old, and
the branch manager was forty-eight years old.  
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1015.  Moreover, the Supreme Court clearly stated that its “broad holding would apply”
even if the procedural deficiencies seen in Olivieri were absent.  Id. at 1013.  
Fortunately, we need not predict whether the Supreme Court would accord
collateral estoppel effect in a case such as this where there appears to be no deficiency of
any kind and where Holster was fully engaged and represented by counsel throughout. 
We need not enter the fray because the District Court found that even if collateral
estoppel effect was not accorded to the issues in dispute, Holster failed to satisfy her
burden of proof on her NJLAD and ERISA claims, a finding with which we agree.  
With reference to the NJLAD claim, the District Court found that because Holster
did not come to work when she did not have jury duty, she was not meeting MCSC’s
legitimate expectations at the time of her termination and, therefore, failed to establish a
prima facie case of age discrimination under NJLAD.   Texas Dep’t of Community2
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (establishing burden shifting analysis for
employment discrimination claims).  The Court went on to find that, even assuming she
had established a prima facie case, MCSC’s explanation that it terminated her because she
deceived MCSC by being absent from work on the premise of jury duty was a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason, and that she failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
7that the stated reason was a pretext for age discrimination.  
Neither did the District Court find any merit to Holster’s ERISA claim and,
indeed, found that MCSC provided compelling evidence to refute that claim.  For
example, Holster had already become vested in the profit-sharing plan and maintained an
option to keep her account balance in the retirement plan, and MCSC had consistently
increased its contributions to the retirement plan even though contributions were
discretionary. 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Holster, as we are obliged to
do, we conclude that the District Court did not err in granting MCSC’s motion for
summary judgment.  We, therefore, will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
